Nanobot Company System
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Post_Dev_Juniorrole is assigned therun_commandtool along with read and write access to the entireworkspace/directory. This configuration allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands, which could be abused to compromise the environment if the agent is provided with malicious instructions in a task order.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its document-based workflow where agents ingest content generated by other agents or users. * Ingestion points: Agents retrieve instructions and data fromDoc_Task_OrderandDoc_Work_Reportfiles within theworkspace/directory. * Boundary markers: TheDOCS_SCHEMA.mdtemplates do not include delimiters or specific instructions to help agents distinguish between system instructions and untrusted data. * Capability inventory: The roles defined inPOSTS.mdhave access to powerful tools includingrun_command,write_file,spawn_worker, andweb_search. * Sanitization: There is no defined process for validating or sanitizing the content of the Markdown documents before they are processed by the agents.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: ThePost_Tech_AnalystandPost_Weather_Analystroles are designed to use theweb_searchtool to fetch information from the internet. This introduces external, untrusted content into theworkspace/documents, which are subsequently processed by other agents in the pipeline, potentially triggering malicious behaviors through indirect injection.
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