bio-data-visualization-genome-browser-tracks

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill demonstrates an attack surface where untrusted external content (genomic data files and user-defined coordinates) is processed and passed to execution-capable tools.
  • Ingestion points: Processes genomic data files including .bw, .bed, .gtf, and .cool. It also accepts string-based 'region' parameters.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: Executes pyGenomeTracks and igv via shell commands and Python's subprocess.run. It also writes configuration files (tracks.ini, igv_batch.txt) to the local filesystem.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of input variables (like $region) is shown, which could lead to shell injection if the agent interpolates user-provided text into the bash loops.
  • [Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on external software packages (pygenometracks, IGV, and R libraries like Gviz) which must be present in the environment. These tools often have complex dependency trees and may execute with the same privileges as the agent.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill generates executable batch scripts for IGV (igv_batch.txt) and configuration files at runtime before passing them to interpreters/CLI tools.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:46 AM