dream
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies critical agent configuration files including
~/.claude/settings.jsonto install a persistent 'Stop' hook. This hook automatically executesdream-hook.shwhenever a session ends. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
dream-hook.shscript spawns a background agent process usingnohup claude -p .... This background process is granted extensive capabilities (Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep) to perform memory consolidation autonomously. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of ingesting untrusted data from session transcripts.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to scan
~/.claude/projects/*/sessions/*.jsonlfiles for user corrections and decisions (Phase 2). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use boundary markers or delimiters when processing these transcripts to prevent embedded instructions from being obeyed.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob, andGreptools across multiple phases to update persistent memory files. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content extracted from transcripts before it is used to modify the agent's long-term memory (
MEMORY.mdand topic files). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
install.shscript and onboarding instructions inSKILL.mduse Python and shell commands to modify local configuration files and create flag files (.dream-pending) in the user's home directory.
Audit Metadata