gitlab-discussion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is designed to fetch and process discussion threads from GitLab, which are attacker-controllable inputs.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow 2, 3, 5) usesglab apito retrieve discussion bodies and metadata. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat the fetched comment data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows
Bashexecution andglab apiwrite operations (POST, PUT, DELETE), providing a significant action surface if an agent is manipulated by fetched content. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on
jqfor parsing but does not sanitize the content of thebodyfield before the agent processes it. - Command Execution (LOW): Several Bash examples in the documentation (e.g., Workflow 1 and 2) use unquoted variables such as
$project_idand$discussion_id. While these are expected to be numeric or system-generated IDs, if an agent provides unsanitized user input containing shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection within the local shell environment.
Audit Metadata