gitlab-repo

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill implements destructive commands like glab repo delete and specifically documents the -y, --yes flag to bypass confirmation prompts. In an autonomous agent context, this creates a significant risk of accidental or malicious data loss.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources (GitLab project metadata, search results) and possesses high-impact capabilities through the Bash tool. A malicious project could use its name or description to attempt to influence the agent's logic.
  • Ingestion points: glab repo search, glab repo view, and glab repo contributors output.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No specific instructions are provided to the agent to treat external project data as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: Full Bash tool access, file read/write through glab operations.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization of repository paths or names is mentioned.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (SAFE): While the skill depends on the external glab binary being present on the system, it does not attempt to download or install it at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 09:15 AM