mentor-guided-learning

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill's core logic involves reading and obeying 'Runtime Rules' from the project-root AGENTS.md. By instructing the agent to 'Read project-root AGENTS.md as the primary runtime rule,' the skill creates a direct path for untrusted data to override the agent's safety constraints and intended behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill explicitly grants the agent authority to write non-critical boilerplate, fully implement critical logic, and provide CLI commands for execution (via assets/AGENTS-template.md). When these capabilities are combined with the instruction-following behavior from AGENTS.md, an attacker can gain arbitrary code execution on the user's system by poisoning the markdown file.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Vulnerability surface identified with a high-privilege capability set.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads AGENTS.md, .LEARNING/learner-profile.md, and .LEARNING/mastery-map.md at every conversation turn.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses <!-- mentor-guided-learning:begin --> markers to delimit rules, but it does not instruct the agent to ignore malicious instructions embedded within those markers.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to write/edit files, generate code, and provide system commands (CLI) for the user to run (or for the agent to execute if equipped with a terminal tool).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety-filtering of the content read from the project files before it is used to influence the agent's decision-making process.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:32 AM