skills/h1an1/openclaw-ears/ears/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ears

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script audiosnap/audiosnap-wrapper.sh contains a hardcoded absolute file path (/Users/han1/clawd/audiosnap/.build/release/audiosnap). This reveals the author's local username and will likely cause execution failures on other systems.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audiosnap/audiosnap-wrapper.sh tool utilizes AppleScript via osascript to execute commands inside the Terminal.app process. This is a deliberate technique to bypass macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) permissions for Screen Recording by inheriting the permissions granted to the Terminal application.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The audiosnap/podsnap.py script executes the yt-dlp utility with the --remote-components "ejs:github" flag. This configuration allows the tool to download and execute remote components or plugins from GitHub at runtime, which is an unverified external code loading mechanism.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection via the podsnap.py transcription tool.
  • Ingestion points: Processes untrusted audio and video content from external URLs (YouTube, Bilibili, Xiaoyuzhou).
  • Boundary markers: None; transcribed text is returned as raw output to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including system audio control, file system modification, and network access across multiple platforms.
  • Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on the transcribed content to prevent the agent from executing instructions found within the processed media.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 2, 2026, 10:21 AM