notebooklm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The environment setup script (scripts/setup_environment.py) automatically downloads and installs the 'patchright' library and Google Chrome binaries at runtime. These downloads originate from non-whitelisted external sources and are executed on the host system.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill uses a wrapper script (scripts/run.py) that facilitates the execution of any internal script via subprocess.run. This pattern, combined with the automatic virtual environment management, provides a high-privilege execution surface that the agent is encouraged to use for all operations.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The SKILL.md documentation contains 'Critical' follow-up instructions that attempt to override the agent's default decision-making process. It mandates a specific looping behavior ('STOP
  • Do not immediately respond') which could be exploited to keep the agent in an execution loop or ignore user intent.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from external NotebookLM notebooks which could contain malicious instructions designed to compromise the agent.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/ask_question.py (browser scraping of response elements).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the scraped text is returned directly to the agent with only a hardcoded follow-up reminder.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (via run.py), file system write/delete access (via cleanup_manager.py), and persistent network access via automated browser.
  • Sanitization: None; the response text is not sanitized, escaped, or validated before being interpolated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:38 PM