youtube-transcript

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is coherent with its stated purpose and contains standard, well-known operations (yt-dlp usage, optional Whisper transcription, and local post-processing). I find no indicators of malicious intent, hidden data exfiltration, or obfuscated/backdoor code. The primary security concerns are operational: (1) executing shell commands and installing packages from package managers carries inherent supply-chain risk, and (2) some shell interpolations and filename handling are insufficiently sanitized which could allow command- or filename-injection issues if fed untrusted inputs. Recommend keeping interactive confirmations, avoid running this workflow with untrusted inputs, and harden any automated integration by sanitizing inputs and pinning/verifying package sources. LLM verification: The document describes a legitimate YouTube-transcript downloader/transcriber workflow. I found no explicit malicious code, hardcoded credentials, or hidden network destinations. Main security concerns are operational and supply-chain: unpinned pip installs, use of shell command substitution without sanitization (risk of command injection or unsafe filenames), and no recommendations for installing/verifying third-party tools in isolated environments. If executed automatically or by an unprivileg