capy-cortex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
picklemodule to deserialize local data files inscripts/cortex.py,scripts/embeddings.py, andscripts/consolidate.py. Deserialization of data usingpickleis unsafe and can result in arbitrary code execution if the files are tampered with. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It ingests data from tool responses and session transcripts, storing them in a database, and subsequently injects this unvalidated content into the agent's prompt context during future interactions. Ingestion points:
on_stop.py(transcript parsing) andon_tool_failure.py(tool output capture). Boundary markers: Present inon_prompt_submit.pyandon_session_start.pyas markdown section headers, though these are not robust against adversarial content. Capability inventory: The agent possesses standard tool capabilities; injected text can influence the agent's decision-making regarding these tools. Sanitization: The skill relies on LLM-based extraction which is an insufficient security filter for adversarial injection patterns. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
dashboard.pyscript initializes a web server listening on0.0.0.0, making the session memory database accessible to any device on the local network. Furthermore, thescripts/bootstrap.pyutility accesses the user's entire Claude projects directory at~/.claude/projectsto mine historical data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external Python dependencies such as
scikit-learnandnumpyand communicates with remote LLM API endpoints (e.g., OpenRouter, OpenAI) to perform its core functions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a monitoring hook (
on_pre_bash.py) that evaluates and can programmatically block bash commands if they match known anti-patterns stored in its database.
Audit Metadata