skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocesscalls in scripts such asscripts/run_eval.pyandscripts/improve_description.pyto execute theclaudeCLI and other local Python modules. This is the intended behavior for automating the skill development and testing workflow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from test outputs and user queries, which are then interpolated into prompts for specialized subagents (Grader, Comparator, and Analyzer). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in a test case could attempt to influence the evaluation or improvement process.
- Ingestion points:
evals/evals.json, skill execution outputs in<workspace>/outputs/, andfeedback.json. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use strong delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded directives when processing test outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and write files to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping for untrusted data was found before interpolation into agent prompts.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript starts a local HTTP server on127.0.0.1. It reads and serves files from the evaluation workspace to provide a user interface for reviewing results, which exposes evaluation data to the local network interface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The HTML viewer (
eval-viewer/viewer.html) loads the SheetJS library fromcdn.sheetjs.comto render spreadsheets in the browser. This is a reference to a well-known service used for legitimate functionality.
Audit Metadata