review-pr
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content from GitHub pull requests, which is a primary vector for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
gh pr view(capturing descriptions and comments) andgh pr diff(capturing code changes) as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack any requirement to use delimiters or 'ignore' blocks to separate system instructions from the PR content being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
ghCLI for GitHub operations. If the environment'sghconfiguration has write permissions (common for PR bots), an attacker could craft a PR that instructs the agent to perform unauthorized actions such as merging code, deleting branches, or exfiltrating repository secrets. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from GitHub.
- Command Execution (LOW): The skill legitimately uses the
ghCLI to perform its stated tasks. While these are standard operations, the reliance on a subprocess-based CLI tool increases the impact of a successful injection attack.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata