find-designs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an Indirect Prompt Injection surface.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 5, the skill fetches a remote file named
SKILL.mdfromhttps://joincommons.cc/api/items/{slug}. - Boundary markers: The agent is instructed to "Follow it first" without any explicit boundary markers or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the downloaded content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access (reading and writing to
.commons/and~/.commons/), network operations (GET/POST requests to joincommons.cc), and command execution (running local Python scripts and curl). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote instruction file content is performed before the agent is told to follow its instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with
https://joincommons.ccto fetch item metadata, search results, and design artifacts. It also downloads image assets from a Cloudflare R2 bucket athttps://pub-962ae6531eaf4fc2b3cd95edcb026436.r2.dev. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a provided Python script
scripts/download_thumbnails.pyto handle asset management. It also provides a fallback instruction for the agent to use thecurlcommand to download images manually. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: During the initialization phase, the skill silently scans project files such as
package.jsonand CSS configurations. It also accesses user-specific taste profiles located at~/.commons/global-taste.json. Data derived from these files is sent to the externaljoincommons.ccAPI during search queries and installation tracking.
Audit Metadata