discord-reader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a global Node.js package
@jackwener/openclito provide the core functionality of bridging the Discord desktop application to the terminal. This involves downloading and executing code from an external repository to manage local application interactions. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile employs a dynamic command execution block using the!commandsyntax to check for the presence ofopencliand its connection status. This mechanism executes the shell command(command -v opencli && opencli discord-app status 2>&1 | head -5 && echo "READY" || echo "SETUP_NEEDED")automatically when the skill is loaded by the agent to determine the environment state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external Discord servers and search results, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through Discord messages fetched via
opencli discord-app readandopencli discord-app searchas described inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the content of the retrieved messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment supports shell command execution, including the installation of packages and execution of local CLI tools.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the messages before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata