discord-reader

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a global Node.js package @jackwener/opencli to provide the core functionality of bridging the Discord desktop application to the terminal. This involves downloading and executing code from an external repository to manage local application interactions.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file employs a dynamic command execution block using the !command syntax to check for the presence of opencli and its connection status. This mechanism executes the shell command (command -v opencli && opencli discord-app status 2>&1 | head -5 && echo "READY" || echo "SETUP_NEEDED") automatically when the skill is loaded by the agent to determine the environment state.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external Discord servers and search results, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through Discord messages fetched via opencli discord-app read and opencli discord-app search as described in SKILL.md and references/commands.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the content of the retrieved messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment supports shell command execution, including the installation of packages and execution of local CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the messages before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 08:04 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — discord-reader