telegram

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs the tdl binary from an external repository to facilitate Telegram access.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests an installation pattern where a remote script is piped directly to the shell: curl -sSL https://docs.iyear.me/tdl/install.sh | sudo bash. This represents a high-risk execution of unverified remote code with root privileges.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions utilize sudo for privilege escalation during the installation of the tdl tool, which could allow unauthorized system modifications.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external Telegram message content.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted message data is exported to /tmp/tdl-export.json and read using the cat command as specified in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No protective delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands are used when the agent processes the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to execute shell commands and perform file system operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the Telegram message data before it is presented to the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 19, 2026, 08:13 PM