ask-copilot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute the
copilotCLI with the--allow-all-toolsflag. This flag is explicitly designed to auto-approve and execute any tools or commands suggested by the underlying LLM, bypassing human-in-the-loop safety checks and confirmation prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The combination of prompt mode (
-p) and auto-approval (--allow-all-tools) allows for non-interactive, arbitrary command execution. If the agent passes untrusted data into the prompt parameter, it could result in unauthorized file access, system modifications, or data exfiltration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection by accepting arbitrary strings in the
-p(prompt) argument which are then processed by a secondary agent with elevated execution privileges. - Ingestion points: The prompt parameter (
-p) in thecopilotcommand used across multiple examples inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or defensive instructions are provided to separate user-supplied content from agent instructions within the command string.
- Capability inventory: The
copilotCLI has the capability to execute shell commands, perform file system operations, and interact with the local development environment. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions within the prompt string before it is passed to the CLI.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata