ask-copilot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to pass untrusted strings directly to a CLI that has execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The
-pargument incopilot -p "..."(referenced in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The prompt is interpolated directly into the shell command.
- Capability inventory: The
copilotCLI, as described, can perform code generation, debugging, and 'delegating coding tasks' which typically involves file writes and shell execution. - Sanitization: None. The documentation explicitly recommends using
--allow-all-tools, which bypasses the tool's internal security prompts. - [Remote Code Execution] (HIGH): The combination of prompt-based input and the
--allow-all-toolsflag creates a direct path for arbitrary code execution. If an attacker influences the prompt passed to this skill, they can execute any shell command thecopilotutility is capable of running. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The
allowed-toolspolicyBash(copilot *)is overly broad. It grants the agent permission to execute any subcommand or flag of thecopilotutility, including those that might be used for data exfiltration or persistence if supported by the CLI.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata