tmux
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from terminal outputs which can then influence the agent's next actions.
- Ingestion Points: Output is captured in
scripts/wait-for-text.shand via thecapture-paneinstructions inSKILL.md. - Boundary Markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the captured terminal text.
- Capability Inventory: The agent has the ability to execute arbitrary commands via
tmux send-keys, manage files, and spawn processes (including other agents like 'Codex' with--yoloflags as suggested in the documentation). - Sanitization: None. Raw terminal output is piped directly into the agent's context or processed via
grep. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to facilitate command execution. If an agent is compromised via indirect injection from a file it is 'scraping' via a tmux pane, it can be forced to execute malicious shell commands (e.g., recursive deletion, credential harvesting, or reverse shells) using the
send-keysfunctionality. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The
capture-panefunctionality allows for the extraction of large amounts of terminal history (up to 2000 lines by default in the scripts). This history may contain sensitive information such as environment variables, hardcoded secrets, or private data displayed during previous CLI operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata