scout
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashsubagent type to execute shell commands, includingcat,sed,wc, and third-party CLI tools likegeminiandopencode. - Evidence: Found in
references/external-scouting.mdandreferences/internal-scouting.mdwhere the agent is instructed to run commands likegemini -y -m <model> "[prompt]"andsed -n '1,500p' large-file.ts. - Risk: The construction of these commands using variable placeholders (e.g.,
[prompt]) without explicit sanitization patterns creates a command injection surface if the prompt or file paths contain shell-special characters. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function is to send contents of the local codebase to external AI services via the
geminiandopencodeCLI tools. - Evidence:
references/external-scouting.mdexplicitly defines workflows to pass codebase search results and file contents to these external agents. - Risk: This involves transmitting potentially sensitive or proprietary code to third-party endpoints, which may not be governed by the same security policies as the local environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the user to install external third-party CLI tools (
geminiandopencode) if they are not already present on the system. - Evidence:
references/external-scouting.mdcontains a section "Installation Check" that instructs the agent to ask the user to install these tools. - Risk: Encouraging the installation of non-standard or unverified binary tools can introduce supply chain risks if the installation source is not trusted.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads from local configuration files that may contain sensitive settings or API keys.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/external-scouting.mdreference reading configuration from.claude/.ck.json. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the codebase and passes it to LLM-powered subagents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files from the local filesystem (e.g.,
src/,lib/) usingcat,sed, and CLI tools as described inreferences/external-scouting.mdandreferences/internal-scouting.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions provided to the subagents do not include delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the files being scanned.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Tasktool withsubagent_type: "Bash", granting the agent full shell access to the local environment. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or validating the content read from the files before it is processed by the agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata