bilibili-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinbili_cli/auth.pyto execute a Python script that retrieves browser cookies. This script is generated from a hardcoded template and executed using the current Python interpreter. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the Bilibili platform, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Video metadata (titles, descriptions), user-provided subtitles, and comments are fetched via
bili_cli/client.pyand returned to the agent. - Boundary markers: Output is structured using YAML and JSON envelopes, which provide delimiters but do not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore instructions within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of file system writes (credential storage and audio segmenting), network communication with Bilibili's API, and subprocess execution for authentication.
- Sanitization: Metadata undergoes basic HTML tag removal using
_strip_htmlinbili_cli/payloads.py, but the skill does not filter or sanitize natural language content for malicious instructions. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill extracts sensitive authentication tokens (
SESSDATA) from local browser databases (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave) and stores them in~/.bilibili-cli/credential.jsonwith owner-only permissions (0600).
Audit Metadata