skills/ianphil/my-skills/planner/Gen Agent Trust Hub

planner

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (e.g., git checkout -b feature/{NNN}-{slug}, mkdir -p backlog/plans/{NNN}-{slug}/contracts, and rm backlog/plans/YYYYMMDD-{slug}.md) using variables derived from user input ($ARGUMENTS). If the agent generates a feature 'slug' containing shell metacharacters (such as backticks, semicolons, or pipes) in response to a crafted user request, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input ($ARGUMENTS) and incorporates it into file names and command variables, exposing an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The $ARGUMENTS variable in SKILL.md is the entry point for untrusted data.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands that might be embedded in the user's feature request.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and perform file system operations (write, move, and delete) across the project workspace.
  • Sanitization: While the skill provides stylistic guidelines for the feature slug format (lowercase and hyphenated), it lacks code-level sanitization or shell-safe interpolation mechanisms to ensure the resulting string is safe for execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 03:30 AM