powerpoint

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external command-line utilities using Python's subprocess module to perform document conversion and version comparison.
  • scripts/thumbnail.py executes soffice to generate intermediate PDFs and pdftoppm to produce slide thumbnails.
  • references/ooxml/scripts/pack.py calls soffice headlessly to validate the integrity of OOXML packages.
  • references/ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py uses git diff to identify and validate tracked changes within document XML.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes browser automation through Playwright in scripts/html2pptx.js to render HTML templates into slide layouts.
  • It employs page.evaluate() to run internal JavaScript for measuring dimensions and extracting CSS properties like gradients and shadows.
  • This runtime execution in a browser environment is a necessary part of its layout engine but represents a dynamic execution vector.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture facilitates the ingestion of data from external files, which can contain adversarial instructions targeting the LLM.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through scripts/inventory.py (reading slide content from .pptx) and scripts/replace.py (reading text from .json maps).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate processed document text from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including file system writes, browser automation, and execution of system binaries.
  • Sanitization: Extracted content is processed as raw text without filtering for embedded instructional markers, leaving the surface exposed to indirect injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 02:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — powerpoint