qodo-pr-resolver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it parses and executes "Agent Prompts" extracted from GitHub PR comments.
- Ingestion points: PR comments (general and inline) fetched via
gh api(SKILL.md, references/api-reference.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore nested prompts are present.
- Capability inventory: File-write operations for code fixes, command execution (
git,gh,npm,pytest), and network access via GitHub API. - Sanitization: Employs
sedto remove HTML tags but does not validate the semantic content of the extracted instructions (references/api-reference.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several CLI tools including
ghfor API interaction,gitfor version control, and various test runners (npm,pytest,make,ruff,black) to verify code changes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches PR metadata and discussion threads from the GitHub API, which is a trusted and well-known service. It may also execute dependency installation commands like
npm installorpip installif required by the project environment.
Audit Metadata