cliproxyapi-manager-skill

Fail

Audited by Snyk on May 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes explicit examples and commands that embed management and upstream API keys directly (e.g., --key "MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD", --api-key 'sk-or-v1-...', and Authorization: Bearer <MANAGEMENT_KEY>) and instructs saving management passwords, which can lead an agent to request and echo secrets verbatim even though safer env-var / prompt alternatives are mentioned.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches and parses JSON from a user-configured Management API (e.g., GET /config, /auth-files, /openai-compatibility and the raw command that accepts absolute URLs) and the agent code/usage guide (SKILL.md, references/agent-usage-guide.md, scripts/cliproxyapi_manager.py cmd_list_aliases and cmd_raw) treats that untrusted, user-provided content as input that can drive decisions and subsequent API calls, enabling indirect prompt-injection risk.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.60). The prompt includes an explicit PowerShell execution-policy bypass and exposes commands to modify/replace service configuration and delete sensitive API keys/auth files via the management API, which can compromise the local service and machine state even though it doesn't request sudo or create OS users.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 2, 2026, 07:19 AM
Issues
3