emerging-channels

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command: python campaign-tracker.py --brand {slug} --action list-campaigns. The script campaign-tracker.py is not provided within the skill package, representing an external execution dependency. Furthermore, using a dynamic {slug} variable in a shell command without sanitization instructions poses a command injection risk.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to run an external script (campaign-tracker.py) that is not part of the distributed skill files allows for the execution of arbitrary code present on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill programmatically accesses files in the user's home directory (e.g., ~/.claude-marketing/brands/{slug}/profile.json). This pattern is vulnerable to path traversal if the {slug} variable is manipulated to point to sensitive system files (e.g., ../../.ssh/id_rsa).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core logic involves reading and enforcing content from external files like restrictions.md, messaging.md, and compliance-rules.md without validation.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from ~/.claude-marketing/ and skills/context-engine/ subdirectories.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing the contents of these external files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read files and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing the content of the brand profile or guidelines before applying them to the agent's persona and constraints.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 1, 2026, 01:18 AM