journey-design

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from paths outside of its immediate directory, specifically targeting the user's home directory (~/.claude-marketing/brands/). It accesses files such as _active-brand.json, profile.json, and _manifest.json, which likely contain sensitive business or persona data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The process involves executing a local script journey-engine.py via the command line. This script is invoked with data derived from the journey design process, which can include unvalidated user inputs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via user-provided 'Target audience segments', 'Content assets available', and 'Personalization signals', as well as via brand profiles loaded from the file system.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted content from the system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (journey-engine.py) and orchestrate multiple sub-agents (journey-orchestrator, content-creator, email-specialist).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input data before it is passed to the execution engine or the secondary agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 01:02 PM