prompt-test
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands by interpolating user-supplied variables directly into Python execution strings. This allows for arbitrary command execution if a user provides input containing shell metacharacters.
- Evidence: The process section in
SKILL.mddescribes multiple instances of unsafe command construction, such aspython scripts/prompt-ab-tester.py --brand {slug} --action create-test --test-name "{name}"andpython scripts/eval-runner.py --brand {slug} --action run-quick --text "{content_or_path}". - Vulnerability: An attacker can provide a value like
test"; touch /tmp/pwned; #for the{name}variable to execute arbitrary system commands alongside the intended script. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads data from a hidden directory in the user's home folder, which may contain sensitive brand profiles, marketing strategies, and agency standard operating procedures.
- Evidence: The skill reads from paths including
~/.claude-marketing/brands/,~/.claude-marketing/brands/{slug}/profile.json, and~/.claude-marketing/sops/. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted external content as part of its core evaluation logic.
- Ingestion points: The
{content_or_path}and{evidence_path}variables inSKILL.md(Step 3) are used to ingest external data for quality evaluation. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the skill definition.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via subprocess calls to local Python scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before the external content is processed or interpolated into command-line arguments.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata