skills/inference-sh/skills/seedance/Gen Agent Trust Hub

seedance

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and external media assets (images, videos, audio) via URLs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the text or metadata of the referenced files.
  • Ingestion points: Parameters prompt, image, end_image, reference_images, reference_videos, and reference_audios in SKILL.md are used to feed data into the generation model.
  • Boundary markers: None are present in the skill instructions to delimit untrusted user input from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash(belt *) tool to execute shell commands (belt app run), providing a path for potential exploitation if the CLI tool does not sufficiently sanitize inputs.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided prompts or external URLs before they are passed to the CLI command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on executing shell commands via the belt CLI. It uses belt login for authentication, belt app run for model execution, and belt app search/list for discovery. These commands are executed within a Bash environment with belt * permissions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the download of external resources from the vendor's infrastructure:
  • Fetches installation instructions from the inference-sh GitHub repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
  • Instructs the user to install an additional skill using npx skills add belt-sh/cli.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 01:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — seedance