two-agent-harness
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Persistence & Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The
setup-two-agent-system.shscript performs intrusive modifications to the user's environment. It installs multiple shell scripts into~/.claude/hooks/and modifies the global~/.claude/settings.jsonfile. This allows the skill to persistently monitor and intercept every agent action (PreToolUse, PostToolUse, SessionStart, SessionEnd) across all projects, not just those using the harness. - Command Execution & Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The installation script and several hooks (
pre-tool-guard.sh,session-progress-check.sh) usepython3 -cto execute dynamically generated Python code for JSON processing. These scripts interpolate shell variables into the Python strings, a pattern that can lead to code injection if variables ever contain untrusted input. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The
pre-tool-guard.shhook makes tool-blocking decisions based on data read from.claude/progress/feature-list.jsonand a predictable temporary file/tmp/claude-hook-bypass-$$. An attacker capable of writing to these files could bypass the guard or trigger a denial-of-service by causing the agent to block its own tools. - Ingestion points:
.claude/progress/feature-list.json,/tmp/claude-hook-bypass-[PID] - Boundary markers: Absent
- Capability inventory: Can block tool execution, modify
session-state.json, and print mandatory instructions to the agent console. - Sanitization: Relies on
python3JSON parsing; no specific input validation on project data. - External Downloads (LOW): The
init-template.shtemplate includes commands to runnpm install,pip install, andbundle install. While these are standard for development projects, they represent a surface for dependency-related attacks if the agent executes them on untrusted projects.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata