skills/ionfury/homelab/prometheus/Gen Agent Trust Hub

prometheus

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The SKILL.md file instructs the agent to access sensitive credentials located at ~/.kube/<cluster>.yaml to facilitate port-forwarding. Kubeconfig files typically contain administrative certificates and tokens for cluster access.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The urlencode function in scripts/promql.sh is vulnerable to Python code injection. It interpolates a bash variable directly into a python3 -c command using triple quotes ('''$string'''). An attacker providing a malicious PromQL query containing triple single-quotes could break out of the string literal and execute arbitrary Python code on the host.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Both the documentation and the provided script explicitly use and recommend the -k (--insecure) flag with curl. This disables SSL/TLS certificate verification, exposing the agent's communications with the Prometheus API to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes data (metrics, alerts) from an external Prometheus API which could be under the control of a malicious actor. This is an indirect prompt injection surface where attacker-controlled labels or annotations could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Prometheus API response data via scripts/promql.sh.
  • Boundary markers: None implemented in script output or documentation.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via curl, kubectl, and python3.
  • Sanitization: API output is processed by jq but not sanitized before being returned to the LLM context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 01:24 AM