pnote
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
pnote skills pullcommand fetches agent skill files from the vendor's cloud and saves them to~/.claude/skills/. This allows for the dynamic introduction of new logic or capabilities to the agent's environment without requiring a manual update of the base skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the
pnoteCLI through aBash(pnote *)tool, where the agent supplies the command arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection from the content of retrieved notes and snippets. 1. Ingestion points: Note data is retrieved from a remote database via
pnote notes getandpnote search. 2. Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved note content. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has access to thepnoteCLI which can perform network operations and file system modifications. 4. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of note content is performed. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation includes the
-p <pin>and--pin <pin>flags for authentication, which can lead to sensitive PINs being exposed in the shell's command history if used as described.
Audit Metadata