skill-learner

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions in references/correction-patterns.md under the 'Detecting the Skill's Repo' section direct the agent to read ~/.claude/skills/<skill-name>/.git/config. This file often contains sensitive information, including plain-text authentication tokens or personal access tokens embedded within remote URLs (e.g., https://<token>@github.com/...). Reading this file exposes these credentials to the agent's context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The core functionality of the skill is to ingest and store natural language instructions ('corrections') that are persistently applied to the agent in future sessions. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads instructions from ~/.claude/skill-corrections/ACTIVE_CORRECTIONS.md and individual markdown files within ~/.claude/skill-corrections/skills/.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt appended to the user's CLAUDE.md simply instructs the agent to 'check... and apply' the corrections without utilizing strict delimiters or instructions to treat the content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses Read, Edit, Write, and Glob capabilities, allowing it to modify the agent's operating instructions and filesystem across sessions.
  • Sanitization: While the skill includes a 'NEVER' rule against saving corrections that bypass safety, there is no technical validation, escaping, or sanitization of the user-provided text before it is stored and later re-injected into the agent's system context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 5, the skill instructions require the agent to modify the global ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md configuration file. By appending instructions to this file, the skill establishes a persistence mechanism that automatically alters the agent's behavior and system prompt for all subsequent sessions, which could be abused to maintain unauthorized behavioral overrides.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 12:30 PM