skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool frequently utilizes the
subprocessmodule across multiple scripts (run_eval.py,run_loop.py,package_skill.py,generate_review.py) to execute theclaudeCLI, manage local server processes withlsofandkill, and package files withzip. This is necessary for the skill's primary purpose of orchestrating skill lifecycles. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted user-provided test queries and render external agent outputs.
- Ingestion points: User-defined test prompts are read from
evals.jsoninscripts/run_eval.py. Resulting output files (text, images, spreadsheets) are ingested and displayed by theeval-viewercomponent. - Boundary markers: While the tool uses structured JSON for metadata, the
scripts/run_eval.pyscript generates temporary markdown command files for testing without explicit delimiters to separate the skill description from the queries being tested. - Capability inventory: The tool has the ability to execute shell commands, read/write local files, and initiate a local web server on the loopback interface (
127.0.0.1). - Sanitization: The evaluation viewer correctly utilizes HTML entity escaping for text rendering and standard libraries for processing image and spreadsheet data, reducing the risk of XSS during result review.
Audit Metadata