skillctx-ify

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and writes to sensitive configuration paths, specifically creating and updating a centralized secrets repository at ${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-~/.config}/skillctx/config.json. It is designed to scan for and aggregate sensitive data patterns including API keys, bearer tokens (sk-..., xoxb-...), and system-specific absolute paths.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves modifying the source code of other skills to include executable scripts. It copies a Python resolver script (scripts/resolve.py) to the target skill's directory and injects instructions into the target skill's SKILL.md file that prompt the agent to execute this script via the command line.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the content of third-party skill files to identify variables for migration.
  • Ingestion points: Target skill's SKILL.md and all referenced files within the target skill directory (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are used when parsing the untrusted content of the target skills.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (to modify the target skill and its configuration) and instruction-injection capabilities (adding a setup block to the target skill), as implemented in SKILL.md and scripts/resolve.py.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on pattern matching for classification and provides a manual confirmation step for the user, but it lacks automated sanitization or escaping of the ingested data during the migration process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 19, 2026, 05:17 AM