skillctx-ify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and writes to sensitive configuration paths, specifically creating and updating a centralized secrets repository at
${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-~/.config}/skillctx/config.json. It is designed to scan for and aggregate sensitive data patterns including API keys, bearer tokens (sk-..., xoxb-...), and system-specific absolute paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves modifying the source code of other skills to include executable scripts. It copies a Python resolver script (
scripts/resolve.py) to the target skill's directory and injects instructions into the target skill'sSKILL.mdfile that prompt the agent to execute this script via the command line. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the content of third-party skill files to identify variables for migration.
- Ingestion points: Target skill's
SKILL.mdand all referenced files within the target skill directory (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are used when parsing the untrusted content of the target skills.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (to modify the target skill and its configuration) and instruction-injection capabilities (adding a setup block to the target skill), as implemented in
SKILL.mdandscripts/resolve.py. - Sanitization: The skill relies on pattern matching for classification and provides a manual confirmation step for the user, but it lacks automated sanitization or escaping of the ingested data during the migration process.
Audit Metadata