agent-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL): The skill provides installation instructions in SKILL.md and references/authentication.md that use curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This is a classic RCE pattern where a script from an untrusted external domain is executed with the privileges of the current user without prior inspection.
  • External Downloads (HIGH): The installer downloads pre-compiled binaries from dist.inference.sh. As inference.sh is not among the trusted providers defined in the safety scope, these binaries cannot be verified for integrity or absence of malicious code, posing a supply-chain risk.
  • Credential Management (LOW): The tool relies on INFSH_API_KEY and a local configuration file populated via infsh login. While standard for CLI applications, the skill context allows the agent to interact with these credentials, creating a potential path for exposure if the agent is manipulated.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill processes data from untrusted sources, specifically web search results (Tavily/Exa) and external AI model outputs.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via infsh app run outputs and search queries in references/app-discovery.md and references/running-apps.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided reference materials.
  • Capability inventory: The Bash(infsh *) tool allows for network operations, file writing (--save), and Twitter automation (x/post-tweet).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or output escaping is found in the CLI reference.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 06:25 PM