opencli-usage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents the
opencli plugin install github:user/repocommand, which enables the installation of third-party code from arbitrary, unverified GitHub repositories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
Bashtool to runopenclicommands, which includes functionality to install external tools via system package managers likebrew,apt, andnpmthrough theopencli external installinterface. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports the creation and execution of custom JavaScript adapters and the registration of arbitrary external binaries (e.g., via
opencli external register), which are executed at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection as it facilitates the ingestion of data from untrusted external websites and applications.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
opencli <site> <command>andopencli browserextraction commands described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or delimiters for the data returned from external sites.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (
Bash), file reading (Read), and automated browser interaction. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is documented for the content retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata