tavily-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/tavily_search.pyaccesses the sensitive file path~/.openclaw/.envto retrieve theTAVILY_API_KEY. While this is a documented configuration mechanism for the skill, reading from credential stores is a sensitive operation. The extracted key is then transmitted via a POST request to the Tavily API (api.tavily.com), which is a well-known service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external web searches.
- Ingestion points: Search results including snippets and content from
scripts/tavily_search.pyare returned directly to the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The output format does not include explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in the search results.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute shell commands and perform network operations based on its instructions.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the retrieved web content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata