vercel-workflow

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill instructs the user to install the workflow package via npm i workflow. On the public npm registry, the workflow package is an unmaintained legacy library from 2013 and is not the official SDK for Vercel Workflow, which typically uses @upstash/workflow. This brand impersonation suggests a high risk of a supply chain attack.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The documentation encourages running npx workflow web and other CLI tools from the unverified workflow package. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the host machine from an untrusted source.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Several commands, including npx workflow inspect runs and npx workflow web, are recommended for use. These commands execute binaries from an unverified package that lacks a clear trust chain.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The chatWorkflow AI agent example processes untrusted user messages and has access to web search tools and the network, creating a significant surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: chatWorkflow(messages: UIMessage[]) in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent processes input messages directly without delimiters or system instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to a searchWeb tool and makes arbitrary network requests via an override of the global fetch (file: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; no input validation or output filtering is demonstrated.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:43 PM