vercel-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill instructs the user to install the
workflowpackage vianpm i workflow. On the public npm registry, theworkflowpackage is an unmaintained legacy library from 2013 and is not the official SDK for Vercel Workflow, which typically uses@upstash/workflow. This brand impersonation suggests a high risk of a supply chain attack. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The documentation encourages running
npx workflow weband other CLI tools from the unverifiedworkflowpackage. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the host machine from an untrusted source. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Several commands, including
npx workflow inspect runsandnpx workflow web, are recommended for use. These commands execute binaries from an unverified package that lacks a clear trust chain. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The
chatWorkflowAI agent example processes untrusted user messages and has access to web search tools and the network, creating a significant surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). - Ingestion points:
chatWorkflow(messages: UIMessage[])inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent processes input messages directly without delimiters or system instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to a
searchWebtool and makes arbitrary network requests via an override of the globalfetch(file:SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; no input validation or output filtering is demonstrated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata