The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from the plugin directory, specifically SKILL.md and manifest files (Ingestion points: SKILL.md Phase 1). While it uses some XML-style boundary markers like <assessment_report>, it lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings (Boundary markers: insufficient). The skill possesses high capabilities including launching sub-agents via the Agent tool, calling other skills, and writing to the file system (Capability inventory: SKILL.md Phase 1-4). No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed before it is interpolated into agent prompts (Sanitization: absent).
[EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions (SKILL.md Phase 2) direct the agent to run 'uvx skilllint@latest check'. This command fetches and executes code from the public PyPI registry at runtime. Since the package is not from a trusted source, this represents a remote code execution risk if the package is malicious or compromised.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill takes a plugin name as an argument and directly interpolates it into shell-like path structures such as './plugins/<plugin_name/>' across multiple phases. If the input is not strictly validated, it could lead to directory traversal or access to files outside the intended scope.

assessor