audit-agent-lifecycle

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands by interpolating untrusted text responses from sub-agents directly into a command string (e.g., node ... --capabilities 'CAPABILITIES_TEXT'). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the sub-agent output contains shell metacharacters or escape sequences.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of local Node.js scripts (update-agent-map.mjs, populate-agent-descriptions.mjs) found within the plugin root, which perform filesystem and data management operations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by reading and reasoning over the contents of agent configuration files (agents/*.md) which are provided by the user or external plugin. Maliciously crafted content in these files could influence the auditor's findings or be passed to refactoring sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: Agent files located in the agents/ directory and their associated YAML frontmatter.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of these external files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via Node.js, write reports and dependency graphs to the filesystem (.claude/audits/), and delegate tasks to other agents via the Agent tool.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the content extracted from audited agent files is described before it is used to drive analysis or command arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 08:41 AM