implement-feature
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration includes a
SubagentStophook that executes a local Python script to manage task transitions. - Evidence: The YAML frontmatter defines a hook that runs
python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../implementation-manager/scripts/task_status_hook.py". - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic loading of other skills based on the
skillslist provided in task metadata. - Evidence: The instructions include a loop that calls
Skill(skill="{skill-name}")for each item found in a task's skill requirement list. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from task plans and interpolates it directly into delegation prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Task metadata and skill lists are retrieved from local plan files (resolved via
dh_paths.plan_dir()) or GitHub backlog items via thebacklog_get_ready_sam_taskstool. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill treats retrieved task data as trusted instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can spawn new agents (
TeamCreate), load arbitrary skills (Skill), and trigger status updates via MCP tools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the
skillsnames or task instructions before they are passed to sub-agents. - Evidence: The prompt generation logic uses
{comma-separated skill names}and{task_file_path} --task {task_id}directly from the task data.
Audit Metadata