plugin-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches official Claude Code documentation, schema references, and plugin guidelines from code.claude.com to ensure created plugins comply with platform requirements.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes local development tools including git for version control, jq for JSON manipulation, and grep for searching, as well as executing local Python scripts via uv for scaffolding.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Leverages uvx to execute the skilllint package from a remote registry to perform automated validation of skill metadata and structure.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses the local plugins/ directory and the user's global skill repository at ~/.claude/skills/ to research existing implementations and ensure architectural consistency.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because the skill ingests and analyzes third-party plugin code and external documentation.
  • Ingestion points: Content is read from local plugin files, the ~/.claude/skills/ directory, and external documentation URLs.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to sub-agents to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration involves sub-agents (general-purpose, Plan, plugin-assessor) that have permissions to write to the file system and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation of the logic contained within ingested files before they are processed by LLM sub-agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 08:41 AM