work-milestone
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages a complex lifecycle of parallel background processes using
claude -pandgit worktreecommands to handle multi-agent orchestration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow executes arbitrary shell commands defined in the
quality_gatessection of theplan/milestone-{N}-dispatch.yamlfile. This allows for arbitrary command execution guided by external configuration files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from external sources (backlog items and dispatch plans) and interpolates this content into instructions for spawned sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from
plan/milestone-{N}-dispatch.yamland via thebacklog_viewtool. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: Spawned sessions have full orchestrator capabilities, including
Agenttool,TeamCreate, and shell access viaBash. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the backlog content before it is passed to sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
--permission-mode autoflag when spawning sessions, which bypasses user confirmation for tool execution, increasing the risk of autonomous malicious activity if the agent is compromised via injection.
Audit Metadata