cninfo-to-notebooklm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The install.sh script and requirements.txt specify the installation of notebooklm-py and httpx. These are third-party packages from PyPI that do not originate from the defined trusted organizations, posing a supply chain risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The scripts/upload.py file uses subprocess.run to orchestrate the notebooklm CLI. It passes dynamic strings, such as stock names and notebook titles, as command arguments. While it avoids shell=True, the safety of the CLI tool's argument parsing is unverified.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The installation process includes playwright install chromium, which downloads and installs external browser binaries. This execution of remote binary code is a standard but high-privilege operation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Indirect prompt injection surface detected via financial reports.
  • Ingestion points: PDF reports downloaded from cninfo.com.cn (referenced in scripts/run.py and download.py).
  • Boundary markers: None; external PDF files are uploaded directly to the AI service as primary context sources.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of notebooklm CLI and file system cleanup (shutil.rmtree) in scripts/upload.py and scripts/run.py.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize the contents of the downloaded PDFs before processing.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill is designed to transmit potentially sensitive financial data (A-share reports) to an external cloud service (Google NotebookLM). This is the intended behavior but represents data movement outside the local environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:21 PM