senior-qa-engineer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The 'find-skills' skill allows the agent to discover and install external packages from unverified repositories. Evidence:
.agents/skills/find-skills/SKILL.mdexplicitly directs the agent to offer installation of third-party packages usingnpx skills add <package> -g -y. The use of the '-y' flag to bypass confirmation is a high-risk pattern. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): By facilitating the installation of arbitrary code from external GitHub repositories, the system is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution if an attacker provides a malicious skill package.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill pack contains multiple utility scripts and documentation examples that execute shell commands on the host system. Evidence: Python scripts in
.agents/skills/skill-creator/scripts/manage file packaging, and.agents/skills/cicd-testing-integration/SKILL.mdincludes shell command templates for pipeline automation. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is designed to process untrusted data from user stories and defect reports, making it a target for indirect prompt injection. Evidence Chain for Category 8: 1. Ingestion points:
user-story-verifier/SKILL.md(requirement analysis) anddefect-lifecycle-manager/SKILL.md(bug logging). 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the analysis prompts. 3. Capability inventory: The orchestrator can trigger thefind-skillsandskill-creatortools which have significant system permissions. 4. Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization logic for ingested text.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata