qmd-knowledge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the 'qmd' tool from a non-trusted GitHub user account.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects users to runbun install -g https://github.com/tobi/qmd. - Context: Installing software from individual, unverified repositories increases the risk of supply chain attacks.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by recording user-supplied content that is later retrieved and processed by the AI.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/record.shtakes user input for 'learning', 'issue', and 'note' types and writes them to markdown files in~/.ai-knowledges/. - Boundary markers: Data is stored as raw markdown without structural delimiters or system instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands during retrieval.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed in
SKILL.mdto useqmd searchandqmd queryto read these files, creating a loop where malicious instructions stored in notes could be executed in future sessions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering is applied to the input content before it is committed to the knowledge base.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's recording script executes shell commands and an external binary.
- Evidence:
scripts/record.shexecutesqmd embed,qmd collection, andgitcommands to manage the knowledge base index and project context.
Audit Metadata