vibe-kanban
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided
templates/docker-compose.ymlfile mounts the host machine's Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) into the container. This configuration allows the container to communicate directly with the host's Docker daemon, enabling potential host system compromise or privilege escalation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/mcp-setup.shscript programmatically modifies configuration files in the user's home directory, specifically targeting~/.claude/claude_desktop_config.jsonand~/.codex/config.tomlto inject MCP server settings. This represents a significant modification of the local software environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of
npx vibe-kanbanfor immediate execution. This pattern downloads and executes the latest version of a package from the NPM registry at runtime, introducing a risk of supply chain attack if the remote package is compromised. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's backend is configured to communicate with
https://api.vibekanban.comfor remote client initialization. It also manages and exports highly sensitive API keys (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY) required for the orchestrated agents to function. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated filesystem and version control operations, including the creation and deletion of git worktrees and branches (
git worktree add,git branch -D) based on dynamically generated workspace identifiers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted task descriptions from the Kanban board which are then interpolated into the command-line arguments of powerful agent tools like Claude Code and Codex without explicit sanitization or boundary marking, potentially allowing subversion of agent behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata