bytestash
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION' section using coercive language ('YOU MUST', 'Failure... violates your operational requirements') intended to force the agent to use the skill and bypass its standard decision-making process. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
pushcommand inscripts/bytestash-api.shperforms arbitrary file reads viacatand transmits the content to a remote URL. This creates a high-risk capability for data exfiltration if the agent is manipulated into reading sensitive system or configuration files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script executes shell commands such as
curlandjqusing variables constructed from file contents and user-provided arguments. This represents a potential execution risk if malicious content is injected into snippet files or metadata processing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and displays untrusted content (snippet code and descriptions) from an external API.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/bytestash-api.sh(viaapi_requestfunction calls to the ByteStash API). - Boundary markers: None are used when presenting retrieved snippet data to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network access, file system read access, and destructive deletion capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved content is performed before presentation to the agent.
Audit Metadata