tailscale
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses forceful instructional language in SKILL.md to influence agent behavior.
- Evidence: The skill contains headers like '⚠️ MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION ⚠️' and statements such as 'Failure to invoke this skill when triggers occur violates your operational requirements.' These instructions are designed to ensure the agent uses the tool whenever Tailscale-related topics are mentioned, rather than bypassing safety protocols.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references a remote script execution pattern for software installation.
- Evidence: Both
references/troubleshooting.mdandreferences/quick-reference.mdprovide the commandcurl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh. This is a remote code execution pattern, but it targets the official domain of Tailscale, which is a well-known and trusted service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs local system operations and network management via CLI and shell scripts.
- Evidence: The skill makes extensive use of the
tailscaleCLI for connectivity testing, file transfers (tailscale file cp), and network exposure (tailscale funnel). It also uses a custom shell scriptscripts/ts-api.shto wrap API calls. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads locally stored credentials and transmits them to an external API.
- Evidence:
scripts/ts-api.shreads a sensitive API key from~/.claude-homelab/.envand transmits it in the authorization headers tohttps://api.tailscale.com. This is the intended and necessary behavior for the skill to perform its stated function of managing the user's Tailscale network. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection via data ingested from the Tailscale API.
- Ingestion points: Device lists, hostnames, and user tags fetched by
scripts/ts-api.shand presented to the agent. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions for the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded in device metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including file transfer, network service exposure (
funnel), and administrative actions like deleting devices or creating auth keys. - Sanitization: Data is parsed using
jqbut is not filtered for malicious natural language instructions before being added to the context.
Audit Metadata