voice-apply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The script
scripts/voice_loader.pyaccesses the user's home configuration directory (~/.config/aiwg/voices/). While restricted to a specific application subdirectory, access to the user's home directory is a sensitive operation that should be monitored. - PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) through its ingestion of voice profiles.
- Ingestion points: The
voice_loader.pyscript reads YAML files from the current working directory (.aiwg/voices/) and the user's home directory. This data is then loaded into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The
SKILL.mddoes not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing these profile values. - Capability inventory: The agent uses the loaded profile data to perform content transformations, including 'Perspective Shift' and 'Vocabulary Transformation'.
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation to ensure the YAML content (like descriptions or signature phrases) does not contain malicious instructions.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The
SKILL.mdfile documents the use of subprocess calls to runscripts/voice_loader.pyandscripts/voice_analyzer.py. While these are local scripts provided with the skill, users should ensure the arguments passed to these scripts (like profile names) are sanitized to prevent shell injection.
Audit Metadata